In this issue of the journal a nursing sister, a psychiatrist and a paediatrician from London Problems identified for existing methods of confronting such issues included the ad hoc, unstructured and time-starved nature of "the unit or psycho-social meeting" at which such issues were discussed; the acute setting for such discussions; and the tendency for such discussions to be in practice restricted to members of the same discipline who have the same ranking within a discipline, with resulting tensions, including hierarchical and interdisciplinary tensions, often being left unresolved. Another implicit criticism of existing arrangements by their respondents was that nurses had, and had access to, considerably more first by insuring that the hospital remains conscious of itself as a moral community (and not simply a commercial enterprise); second, by exploring and articulating those boundaries of conduct that define the moral character of the hospital". 4 On the other hand a variety of worries about clinical ethics committees are sometimes expressed. Among these are: that they will interfere with that delicate and invaluable component of health care, the doctor-patient relationship, and further erode the professional autonomy of doctors and undermine their responsibility and authority to act on behalf of the their patients5; that they may actually reduce the patient's freedom of choice, and or, by having too many competing concerns, including the interests of the hospital and of its staff, will risk undermining rather than promoting patients' interests; that they will create a further layer of administrative bureaucracy in hospitals that are already overburdened with such bureaucracy; that they will further diminish the already inadequate time available for clinical care; that they will create unnecessary moral and even political dissent6; that they will tend to excessive caution in their analyses and recommendations partly to protect themselves7; and even that they are potentially tyrannical, via perhaps the "tyranny of the God squad". 8 Given the variety of such concerns it seems clear that any introduction of CECs should be exploratory, with the intention of actually investigating the pros and cons of such committees in particular institutions and contexts, as well as investigating which characteristics tend to produce a useful committee and those which tend to impair its functioning. Some survey evidence suggests that certain commonsense assumptions are justified, including the benefits of committees that are inquiring, openminded, non-hierarchical and which include members with some education in bioethics. 13 Whether or not the more specialised functions indicated above are necessary for a CEC, these authors remind us that clinical ethics committees often function in the realms of human fate and human tragedy. In such contexts a committee's role may be that of the chorus in a Greek tragedy. It does not act, but instead "the chorus offers advice and history and support for the protagonist . . . establishes a moral resonance for the hero's fate. Its virtue is its presence and its sympathy and its clear meditation on his or her predicament in a social and historical context.... Beyond the tragic ending, we imagine, the chorus will store up the memory of the struggle just ended, and this will in turn be the stuff ofmoral reflection on some future occasion". This view of the role of CECs is unlikely to appeal to tough-minded seekers of quick decisions. But as Dr Fleetwood and colleagues pointed out about such committees in these pages,'4 the process is more important than the specific outcome. A coin toss would provide a rapid choice between alternatives in a moral dilemma. Clinical ethics committees are obliged to confront all the ambivalence and uncertainty that made the decision difficult in the first place -that would be their value.
